# A Comparative Study on Safeguards Implementation

under Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement

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# Introduction: NCA



- The Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA)
  - Establishes obligations ("Foreign Obligations")
    - Assurances that material or equipment is transferred pursuant to an Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation
      - Peaceful use
      - Retransfer consent
      - Consent prior to reprocessing or enrichment
      - Safeguards and security
  - Imposed by supplier countries
  - Requests maintaining inventory and submitting annual reports
- Under ROK-Canada NCA, Supplementary Arrangement concluded between NSSC and CNSC on 22 Dec 2015
- Under ROK-US NCA, Administrative Arrangement concluded between NSSC and DOE/NNSA on 1 Apr 2016

# Introduction: CSA



- The Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA)
  - Establishes obligations
  - Imposed by the IAEA
  - Requests maintaining inventory and submitting reports
- However, there is a significant gap between SG implementation under the NCA and CSA


#### Fungibility of NM

- Uranium from any source is identical to uranium from any other
- Impossible to physically identify the origin of the uranium


#### International Obligation Exchange

 An exchange of obligations between equivalent quantities of material located in different countries or jurisdictions





- Principle of Fungibility, Equivalence and Proportionality
  - Principle of Fungibility (대체성의 원칙)




- Principle of Fungibility, Equivalence and Proportionality
  - Principle of Equivalence (등가성의 원칙)
    - Loses its separate physical identity



- Principle of Fungibility, Equivalence and Proportionality
  - Principle of Proportionality (비례성의 원칙)

· (Chemically or physically) processed or irradiated



#### Items under the NCA




#### Derived Materials

 NM or material of any origin which has acquired the NCA obligation as a result of being produced or processed with the use of obligated items under the NCA

Indian nuclear weapon in 1974

- "contamination"




#### Expanded Scope

- CSA: all NM within the jurisdiction of the country
- NCA: NM, non-NM, equipment, components technology

## Items under the NCA




#### Derived Materials



### Items under the NCA



#### Derived Materials



#### Reconciliations



#### Reconciliations between the NCA and CSA SG

- ROK-US NCA in 1973
  - "[...] the safeguards rights accorded to the Government of the United States of America [...] will be suspended during the time and to the extent that the Government of the United States of America agreed that the need to exercise such rights is satisfied by a safeguard agreement at contemplated in this paragraph [the IAEA safeguards]."
  - US SG rights were entrusted to the IAEA
- ROK-US-IAEA trilateral agreement of 1968 was suspended by the CSA in 1975
  - Attempt to conclude additional suspension protocol due to the Article 14 of the CSA
  - Instead of signing the suspension protocol, revised ROK-US NCA in 2015 requires annual report

#### Conclusions



- ROK NCAs with 29 Countries
  - Two Administrative Arrangements (US and Australia) and one Supplementary Arrangement (Canada)
- Bilateral cooperation in nuclear energy could be further enhanced through reliable implementation of the NCA obligations.
  - Cooperation between competent authority and nuclear industry is prerequisite
- ROK should establish its policy toward recipient countries
  - Whether to request to maintain the inventories of obligated items and report the changes in the inventory on a regular basis



# Thank you! Any Questions?